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The purpose of this article is to show the no speculation theorem in generalized
rational expectations equilibrium as follows:
Theorem 1 (No speculation theorem) In a pure exchange economy un-
der non-partitional information, the traders are assumed to have a reﬂexive
and transitive information structure and to have strictly monotone preferences.
If the initial endowment are ex-ante Pareto optimal then there exists no other
rational expectations equilibrium for any price with respect to which all traders
are rational about expectations everywhere.
Many authors have shown that there can be no speculation in a rational
expectations equilibrium for an economy under uncertainty (e.g., Kreps [1977],
Milgrom and Stokey [1982], Geanakoplos [1989], Morris [1994] and others).
The serious limitations of the analysis in these researches are its use of the
‘partition’ structure by which the traders receive information. The structure
is obtained if each trader i’s possibility operator Pi : Ω → 2Ω assigning to each
state ω in a state space Ω the information set Pi(ω)t h a ti possesses in ω is
reﬂexive, transitive and symmetric.
One of these requirements, symmetry, is indeed so strong that describes the
hyper-rationality of traders, and thus it is particularly objectionable ( Bacharach
[1985]). The recent idea of ‘bounded rationality’ suggests dropping such as-
sumption since real people are not complete reasoners. In this article we
weaken symmetry imposing only reﬂexivity and transitivity. As Geanakoplos
(1989) has already pointed out, this relaxation can potentially yield important
results in a world with imperfectly Bayesian agents.
The idea has been performed in diﬀerent settings (c.f., Geanakoplos [1989]
or Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] 2). Among other things Geanakoplos (1989)
showed the no speculation theorem in the extended rational expectations equi-
librium under the assumption that the information structure is reﬂexive, tran-
sitive and nested (Corollary 3.2 in Geanakoplos [1989]). The condition ‘nest-
edness’ is interpreted as a requisite on the ‘memory’ of the trader.
Recently, Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002) introduced the notion ‘rationality
about expectations’ with respect to a price system p, interpreted as that each
trader who learns from the price knows his/her expected utility. They showed
the existence theorem of rational expectations equilibrium for an economy
under non-nested, reﬂexive and transitive information structure.
2 The references cited in Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], footnote 3, p.543
2This article is in the line of Geanakoplos (1989). We shall extend the no
speculation theorem in this generalized environment, which is an extension of
Corollary 3.2 in Geanakoplos (1989).
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an illustration of Theorem 1
by a simple example of an economy with knowledge under non-nested informa-
tion structure. In Section 3 we present our model: First we recall a generalized
information structure; the reﬂexive and transitive information structure. Sec-
ondly we introduce an economy with knowledge, which is a generalization of
an economy under asymmetric information. We extend the notion of rational
expectations equilibrium to an economy with knowledge. Section 4 gives the
proof of Theorem 1. We conclude by giving some remarks about the assump-
tions in the theorem.
2 Illustrative example
Let us consider the following situation:
Two traders 1 and 2 are willing to buy and sell the tradeable emissions permits
with each other. Trader 1 is interested in the global warming problem, but
t r a d e r2i sn o ta ta l l .T h e r ei so n ec o m m o d i t y ,a n do n l yu n u s e da l l o w a n c e sa r e
transferable between two traders 1 and 2.
We shall illustrate the situation as follows: Let Ω be the state space consisting
of the three states {ω1,ω2,ω3}:T h es t a t eω1 represents that the temperature
is higher than the normal one, the state ω2 represents that it is the normal
temperature and ﬁnally the state ω3 represents that the temperature is lower
than the normal one.
Trader 1 is sensitive to the environmental change that the temperature be-
comes higher or lower, and so she can know which of either ω1, ω2 or ω3 is
the true state when each of them occurs. Hence trader 1 has her information
structure P1(ω)={ω} for any ω ∈ Ω.
Trader 2 is less sensitive than trader 1. He knows that the temperature is
normal when it is so but he is ignorant of the environmental changes. He can
know that ω2 is the true state when it occurs. However, when the temperature
becomes higher or lower, he cannot understand it. Thus he cannot know which
of either ω2 or ω3 is the true state when ω3 occurs, and he cannot know which
of either ω1 or ω2 is the true state when ω1 occurs. Trader 2 has his information
structure P2(ω1)={ω1,ω2}, P2(ω2)={ω2} and P2(ω3)={ω2,ω3}.
Suppose that traders 1 and 2 have the initial endowments e1(ω)=e2(ω)=1
3ton for every ω ∈ Ω and they have the risk averse utilities: U1(x,ω)=
U2(x,ω)=
√
x + 4 for every ω ∈ Ω. Their common prior µ is given by µ(ω)=3
7
for ω = ω1,ω3 and µ(ω2)=1
7. Then it can be plainly veriﬁed that the traders’
initial endowments are ex-ante Pareto optimal, and the endowments consti-
tute the unique rational expectations equilibrium that the traders know their
expectation given by the information of the price for the economy (Theorem 1).
It should be noted that P2 does not give a partition of Ω.N o n e t h e l e s sP2
has the properties: For any ω ∈ Ω , ω ∈ P2(ω)a n dP2(ξ) j P2(ω)w h e n -
ever ξ ∈ P2(ω). However P2 is not nested 3 because the three sets P2(ω1) ∩
P2(ω3),P 2(ωi) \ P2(ωj)(i,j =1 ,3) are all non-empty.
In this article we shall investigate the pure exchange economies under gener-
alized information structure as like this example.
3T h e M o d e l
Let Ω be a non-empty ﬁnite set called a state space, N = {1,2,···,n} as e t
of ﬁnitely many traders,a n dl e t2 Ω denote the ﬁeld of all subsets of Ω.E a c h
member of 2Ω is called an event and each element of Ω called a state.
3.1 Information structure 4
By this we mean a class (Pi)i∈N of mappings of Ω into 2Ω. The mapping
Pi : Ω → 2Ω is said to be reﬂexive if the following property is true:
Ref ω ∈ Pi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω,
and it is said to be transitive if the following property is true:
Trn ξ ∈ Pi(ω) implies Pi(ξ) j Pi(ω) for any ξ,ω ∈ Ω.
Given our interpretation, an trader i for whom Pi(ω) j E knows, in the
state ω, that some state in the event E has occurred. The set Pi(ω) will be
interpreted as the set of all the states of nature that i knows to be possible at
ω.
3 See Deﬁnition 5 in Section 3.
2 See Bacharach (1985), Binmore (1992).
43.2 Economy with knowledge 5
A pure exchange economy under uncertainty is a tuple hN,Ω,(ei)i∈N,(Ui)i∈N,(µi)i∈Ni
consisting of the following structure and interpretations: There are l commodi-
ties in each state of the state space Ω, and it is assumed that Ω is ﬁnite and
that the consumption set of trader i is Rl
+;
• N = {1,2,···,n} is the set of n traders;
• ei : Ω → Rl
+ is i’s initial endowment;
• Ui : Rl
+ × Ω → R is i’s von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function;
• µi is a subjective prior on Ω for i.
For simplicity it is assumed that (Ω,µ i)i saﬁnite probability space with µi
full support 6for every i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 1 An economy with knowledge EK is a structure hE,(Pi)i∈Ni,i n
which E is a pure exchange economy under uncertainty with a state-space Ω
ﬁn i t ea n dw i t h( Pi)i∈N ar e ﬂexive and transitive information structure on Ω.
We denote by Fi the ﬁeld generated by {Pi(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} and by F the join of
all Fi(i ∈ N); i.e. F = ∨i∈NFi. It is noted that the atoms {Ai(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of
Fi is the partition induced from Pi.W ed e n o t eb y{A(ω) | ω ∈ Ω } the set of
all atoms A(ω)c o n t a i n i n gω of the ﬁeld F = ∨i∈NFi.
By an allocation we mean a proﬁle a =( ai)i∈N of Fi-measurable functions ai
from Ω into Rl







We denote by A the set of all allocations and denote by Ai the set of all the
i’th components: A = ×i∈NAi.
We shall often refer to the following conditions: For every i ∈ N,
A-1 The function ei(·)i sFi-measurable with
P
i∈N ei(ω) ª 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
A-2 For each x ∈ Rl
+, the function Ui(x,·)i sFi-measurable.
A-3 For each ω ∈ Ω, the function Ui(·,ω) is strictly monotone on Rl
+.
A-4 For each ω ∈ Ω, the function Ui(·,ω) is continuous, strictly quasi-
concave and non-saturated 7 on Rl
+.
Here it is noted that A-4 implies A-3.
5 See Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002).
6 I.e., µi(ω) ª 0 for every ω ∈ Ω.
7 I.e.; For any x ∈ Rl
+ there exists an x0 ∈ Rl
+ such that Ui(x0,ω) ª Ui(x,ω).





for each ai ∈ Ai. The endowments e =( ei)i∈N are said to be ex-ante Pareto-
optimal if there is no allocation a =( ai)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, Ei[Ui(ai)] =
Ei[Ui(ei)] and that for some j ∈ N, Ej[Uj(aj)] ª Ej[Uj(ej)].
3.3 Rationality about expectation





We set the event:






which is interpreted as the event ‘i’s expectation at ω’.W ed e n o t eRi = {ω ∈
Ω | Pi(ω) j [Ei[Ui(·)|Pi](ω)] }, interpreted as the event that i knows his/her
interim expectation, and we denote by R =
T
i∈N Ri, interpreted as the event
that all traders know their interim expectations.
Deﬁnition 2 A trader i is rational about his expectation at ω if ω ∈ Ri;t h a t
is, i knows his own expectation at ω.H e / s h ei sr a t i o n a leverywhere about his
expectation if Ri = Ω.
Remark 1 A partitional information structure is an information structure
(Pi)i∈N with the additional condition: For each i ∈ N and every ω ∈ Ω
Sym ξ ∈ Pi(ω) implies Pi(ξ) 3 ω .
An economy under asymmetric information is actually an economy under par-
titional information structure. It is noted that every trader i in an economy
under asymmetric information is always rational everywhere about expecta-
tion; i.e., Ri = Ω.
63.4 Price system and rational expectations equilibrium
Let EK = hN,Ω,(ei)i∈N,(Ui)i∈N,(µi)i∈N,(Pi)i∈Ni be an economy with knowl-
edge. A price system is a non-zero F-measurable function p : Ω → Rl
+. We
denote by ∆(p) the set of all atoms of the smallest ﬁeld σ(p)t h a tp is measur-
able, and by ∆(p)(ω)t h ec o m p o n e n tc o n t a i n i n gω.T h ebudget set o fat r a d e r
i at a state ω for a price system p is deﬁned by
Bi(ω,p): ={ a ∈ R
l
+ | p(ω) · a 5 p(ω) · ei(ω) }.
Let ∆(p) ∩ Pi : Ω → 2Ω be deﬁned by (∆(p) ∩ Pi)(ω): =∆(p)(ω) ∩ Pi(ω);
it is plainly observed that ∆(p) ∩ Pi is a reﬂexive and transitive information
structure of trader i.W ed e n o t eb yσ(p) ∨ Fi the join of the ﬁelds σ(p)a n d
Fi, which coincides with the ﬁeld generated by (∆(p) ∩ Pi), and denote by
Ai(p)(ω) the atom containing ω.O nn o t i n gt h a tPi satisﬁes Ref and Trn,i t
can be plainly observed that
Ai(p)(ω)=( ∆(p) ∩ Ai)(ω).
Deﬁnition 3 A rational expectations equilibrium for an economy EK with
knowledge is a pair (p,x), in which p is a price system and x =( xi)i∈N is an
allocation satisfying the following conditions:
RE 1 For every i ∈ N, xi is σ(p) ∨ Fi-measurable.
RE 2 For every i ∈ N and for every ω ∈ Ω, xi(ω) ∈ Bi(ω,p).
RE 3 For all i ∈ N,i fyi : Ω → Rl
+ is σ(p) ∨ Fi-measurable with yi(ω) ∈
Bi(ω,p) for all ω ∈ Ω then
Ei[Ui(xi)|∆(p) ∩ Pi](ω) = Ei[Ui(yi)|∆(p) ∩ Pi](ω)
pointwise on Ω.





The proﬁle x =( xi)i∈N is called a rational expectations equilibrium allocation.
3.5 Rationality with respect to price
We denote by Ri(p) the event that i is rational about his expectation; i.e.,
Ri(p)={ω ∈ Ω | (∆(p) ∩ Pi)(ω) j [Ei[Ui(·)|∆(p) ∩ Pi](ω)] }
and denote by R(p) the event that all traders are rational: i.e., R(p)=
T
i∈N Ri(p). The set Ri(p) is interpreted as the event that i knows his in-
terim expectation when he receives the information of the price p,a n dR(p)
interpreted as all traders know their expectations under the information of p.
7Deﬁnition 4 At r a d e ri is said to be rational about his/her expectation with
respect to a price system p at ω if ω ∈ Ri(p). And all traders are rational
everywhere about their expectations if R(p)=Ω.
In these circumstances it can be obtained that:
Proposition 1 (Matsuhisa and Ishikawa [2002], Theorem 2 ) Suppose an econ-
omy with knowledge satisﬁes the conditions A-1, A-2 and A-4. The initial
endowments allocation is ex-ante Pareto optimal if and only if it is a rational
expectations equilibrium allocation relative to a price with respect to which the
traders are rational everywhere about their expectations.
In this generalized environment, Theorem 1 is to characterize the Pareto opti-
mality of initial endowments under the extended notion ‘rational expectations
equilibrium’ allocation relative to a price with respect to which the traders
are rational everywhere about their expectations.
Deﬁnition 5 An information structure (Pi)i∈N is said to be nested if for
each i ∈ N and for all states ω and ξ in Ω,e i t h e rPi(ω) ∩ Pi(ξ)=∅,o re l s e
Pi(ω) j Pi(ξ)o rPi(ω) k Pi(ξ).
Remark 2 Geanakoplos (1989) introduced the notion of ‘nested information’
above, and he established the no speculation theorem for an economy with
knowledge under nested information:
The example proposed in Section 2 illustrates our version of no speculation
theorem under a reﬂexive, transitive and non-nested information structure.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
We can now state Theorem 1 explicitly as follows:
Proposition 2 Let EK be a pure exchange economy with knowledge satisfying
the conditions A-1, A-2 and A-4. If the initial endowments allocation e =
(ei)i∈N is ex-ante Pareto optimal then it is the unique rational expectations
equilibrium allocation for the economy EK relative to some price system with
respect to which all traders are rational everywhere about their expectations.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : In view of Proposition 1, the initial endowments e is a
rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to a price with respect to
which the traders are rational everywhere about their expectations. Therefore,
Proposition 2 immediately follows from:
Proposition 3 Let EK be a pure exchange economy with knowledge satisfy-
8ing A-2. Suppose that the initial endowments allocation e is ex-ante Pareto
optimal. If x is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation for the economy
EK relative to some price system with respect to which all traders are rational
everywhere about their expectations then x = e.
Before proceeding with the proof of Proposition 3 we need the below funda-
mental lemma that plays an essential role in the proof.
A decision function f of 2Ω into a decision set Z is said to satisfy the sure
thing principle if it is preserved under disjoint union; that is, for every pair of
disjoint events S and T, f(S ∪ T)=d if f(S)=f(T)=d. The function f
is said to be preserved under diﬀerence provided that for all events S and T
with S j T, f(T \ S)=d if f(S)=f(T)=d.






is preserved under diﬀerence and it satisﬁes the sure thing principle.
Lemma 4 (Fundamental Lemma) Let Q : Ω → 2Ω be a reﬂexive and tran-
sitive information structure on Ω and A : Ω → 2Ω the partition induced from
Q that is deﬁned by
A(ω): ={ξ ∈ Ω | Q(ξ)=Q(ω) }.
Suppose that f is a decision function which satisﬁes the sure thing principle
and is preserved under diﬀerence. If Q(ω) j {ξ ∈ Ω | f(Q(ξ)) = f(Q(ω)) }
for an ω ∈ Ω then we obtain that for every ξ ∈ Q(ω),
f(A(ξ)) = f(Q(ω)).
Proof: See Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let p be a price system. It is ﬁrst noted that for all
ω ∈ Ω and all ai ∈ Ai,
Ei[Ui(ai)|(∆(p) ∩ Pi)](ω)=Ui(ai(ω),ω). (1)
In fact, since Ω = Ri(p) it follows from Fundamental Lemma (Lemma 4) that
for all ω ∈ Ω, Ei[Ui(ai)|(∆(p) ∩ Pi)](ω)=Ei[Ui(ai)|Ai(p)](ω). In view of A-2
it is observed that for every ω ∈ Ω, Ei[Ui(ai)|Ai(p)](ω)=Ui(ai(ω),ω), as
required.
9For each ω ∈ Ω we denote by EK(ω) the economy with complete information
hN,(ei(ω))i∈N,(Ui(·,ω))i∈Ni.L e t( p,x) be a rational expectations equilibrium
for EK.W es h a l ls h o wt h a t
Claim (p(ω),x(ω)) is a competitive equilibrium of EK(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω
Proof of Claim:F o re a c hi ∈ N and for any yi ∈ Bi(ω,p), we set the σ(p)∨Fi-






yi if ξ ∈ Ai(p)(ω)
ei(ξ)i fξ / ∈ Ai(p)(ω),
and zi(ω) ∈ Bi(ω,p). It follows from RE 3 together with Eq.(1) that for every
ω ∈ Ω,
Ei [Ui(xi)|(∆(p) ∩ Pi)](ω)=Ui(xi(ω),ω)
= Ei[Ui(zi)|(∆(p) ∩ Pi)](ω)=Ui(zi(ω),ω)=Ui(yi,ω).
Therefore by RE 4 we have observed that (p(ω),x(ω)) is a competitive equi-
librium of EK(ω).
Now we shall turn to the proof of Proposition 3. Because e is ex-ante Pareto
optimal, there exists j ∈ N such that Ej[Uj(ej)] ª Ej[Uj(xj)]. On noting that
µ is full support it can plainly obtained that for some ω0 ∈ Ω, Uj(ej(ω0),ω0) ª
Uj(xj(ω0),ω0). On the other hand, in view of the fundamental theorem of
welfare economics for EK(ω) it follows by Claim that x(ω)i sP a r e t oo p t i m a l ,8
and it is obtained that Uj(xj(ω0),ω0) = Uj(ej(ω0),ω0), in contradiction. This
completes the proof.
5 Concluding remarks
As already has remarked, we extend the no speculation theorem to an econ-
omy under a reﬂexive, transitive and non-nested information structure. This
is a generalization of Geanakoplos’s version of the no speculation theorem
(Corollary 3.2 in Geanakoplos [1989]).
It will well end this article in giving a remark about the ancillary assump-
tions A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4. These conditions play the crucial role on the
existence of rational expectations equilibrium in an economy with knowledge.
The suppression of any of these assumptions renders Proposition 1 vulnerable
to the discussion and the example proposed in Remarks 4.6 of Matsuhisa and
8 This is true without A-2.
10Ishikawa (2002). Therefore each of the assumptions A-1 to A-4 is also crucial
in Theorem 1.
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